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Executive shareholding, compensation, and analyst forecast of Chinese firms 
 
Abstract 
We examine the impact of executive and leadership shareholding and cash 
compensation on analyst forecast error and dispersion as proxies for information 
asymmetry. We find that firms pay higher compensation (or excess compensation) to 
executives and directors are associated with higher information asymmetry. The 
positive association is stronger where executives’ and directors’ shareholdings are 
higher. Shareholding appears to facilitate managerial entrenchment and gives highly 
paid executives/leadership stronger structural power which adversely affects 
information disclosure leading to larger forecast error and dispersion. These results are 
robust to different measures of compensation and alternative models controlling for the 
predictability of firm level earnings. Our findings indicate that executive/director 
shareholding and compensation do not provide sufficient incentives for information 
disclosure by Chinese firms. 
 
JEL classifications: G3; M4 




A vibrant strand of literature on firm governance addresses how managerial behavior 
and compensation affect firm value using ex-post accounting performance and observed 
market prices, such as Tobin’s Q ratio (Firth et al., 2006b; Hu and Zhou, 2008; Yuan et 
al., 2008). Studies that employ the viewpoint of stock analysts’ earnings forecasts in the 
context of emerging countries such as China are scant. Yu (2010) suggests analysts’ 
consensus earnings forecast represents the market expectations for firm performance 
and the forecast dispersion is a reflection of uncertainty over cash flows i.e., a proxy for 
risk. As information intermediaries and external monitors of corporate performance, 
analysts directly influence security valuation as well as investors’ judgement and 
behavior (Yuan et al., 2008). A recent study by Bai et al. (2016) also support analysts’ 
role as producers of firm-specific information in China’s IPO market by documenting 
that analyst coverage reduces synchronicity during the 2009-2012 period. Moshirian et 
al. (2009) report that stock prices react strongly to stock analyst recommendations and 
revisions in emerging markets including China. Recent studies by Haß et al. (2014), 
Huang and Wright (2015), and Huang (2016) on Chinese listed firms utilize the forecast 
error of consensus analysts’ earnings forecast and the dispersion of forecasts as proxies 
for information asymmetry to analyze the influence of corporate governance and firm 
ownership structure on firm level information environment and document a positive 
relation between governance and information quality. In this paper, we extend prior 
studies on corporate governance and information asymmetry in China by focusing on an 
important yet unexplored governance mechanism - executive and leadership
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shareholding and compensation. Specifically, we examine the effects of firm executive 
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and leadership shareholding and compensation on analysts’ earnings forecasts and 
analysts’ forecast dispersion. Our argument is that within-firm governance and 
managerial compensation provide incentives for information disclosure which 
influences analysts’ forecasts. To this end, we utilize the information of analysts’ 
earnings forecasts from a new dataset which compiles firm level forecasts from the top 
50 Chinese securities companies whose major business is brokerage, consultancy, 
sponsoring securities offering and listing, and asset management.  
 
Governing boards utilize executive compensation contracts in an attempt to align 
executive actions with corporate goals (Ashley and Yang, 2004). The exploration of the 
relationship between executive and leadership shareholding, compensation, and 
analysts’ forecasts in the world’s largest emerging market is significant for the 
following reasons. The nature of Chinese leadership of firms appears to be different 
from that in Western countries. According to Chen et al. (2011), firm leadership in 
China mirrors the characteristics of Chinese society: its collectivist culture, social 
harmony, socialist politics and the associated political connections. The leaders of 
Chinese firms are predominantly insiders with political connections as most Chinese 
listed companies have evolved from state owned enterprises (SOEs). The government 
frequently appoints top executive management and their compensation does not relate to 
stock returns (Firth et al., 2006a). Such features of firm leadership may result in 
excessive management power which may adversely affect performance, information 
quality, distort the use of pay as incentive device to improve performance and 
exacerbate agency problems. Conversely, it may be argued that executive ownership 
better aligns the interests of managers and that of shareholders thereby improving 
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information quality and firm value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Han et al., 2014). 
Despite the conflicting views on the effects of managerial ownership, we know 
relatively little regarding the association between Chinese firm executive/leadership 
ownership and analyst forecasts and forecast dispersion (see Han et al., 2014). In 
addition to executive ownership, studies on the structure of executive compensation 
such as Ashley and Yang (2004) reveal that the effect of high earnings persistence 
results in firms that focus more heavily on cash compensation (salary and bonus) rather 
than on equity compensation (stock options, etc.) due to earnings targeting. It is 
uncertain how the level of cash compensation may affect earnings persistency and 
predictability in China where executive compensation is predominantly in cash forms 
(Chen et al., 2011). For the above reasons, the study on executive ownership, 
compensation, and analysts’ forecasts in the Chinese market is particularly timely as 
agency theory suggests that executives/leadership ownership and compensation 
schemes may serve to either mitigate (alignment effects) or exacerbate (entrenchment 
effects) agency conflicts and affect the analysts’ information environment (Chung et al., 
2015; Han et al., 2014). 
 
The sheer size of Chinese stock markets and the continual opening of the stock markets 
to international investors warrant an examination of how corporate governance 
mechanisms affect investors’ expectations. The use of information asymmetry proxies 
based on analysts’ earnings forecasts in the Chinese emerging market is timely because 
information asymmetry appears to be more severe in emerging countries due to weak 
corporate governance systems. Thus the use of information asymmetry proxies 
represents an important departure from the previous studies that have used only realized 
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earnings data and measures based on market values to directly assess the influence of 
executive compensation and managerial ownership on firm value (Firth et al, 2006b; Hu 
and Zhou, 2008; Yuan et al., 2008). From a broader perspective, this study contributes 
to executive management shareholding, compensation and agency theory discourse 
which has attracted intense debate predominantly in advanced market economies with 
relatively little attention in emerging economies such as China. Specifically, this paper 
contributes to the literature that investigates the role of executive shareholding and 
compensation on analysts’ information environment. We document that excess 
compensation to executives is associated with information asymmetry and analyst 
forecast dispersions.   In addition, we add to the understanding of the link between 
managerial ownership, cash compensation and analyst forecast information in the 
world’s largest emerging market. The focus of analyst forecast information is 
interesting and significant because analysts represent important outside governance 
mechanisms that is neither directly controlled by the firm nor entirely environmentally 
determined (see Lang et al., 2004). In this regard, the study sheds lights on how 
analysts, an important external monitoring group, incorporate within-firm governance 
mechanisms particularly executive management shareholding and cash compensation, 
into their earnings forecasts.  
 
The remainder of this study is structured in the following way. The next section 
introduces briefly the background literature and develops the hypotheses of the study. A 
general description of our research approach is also provided in light of these 
governance features. Section 3 describes the data and methodology. Section 4 comprises 




2. Background literature and hypotheses development 
2.1 Related literature 
Corporate governance generally constitutes the set of complementary mechanisms that 
help to align the actions and decisions of top managers with the interests of 
shareholders. According to agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), when the 
shareholders are too diffused to monitor the managers, corporate assets can be used for 
the benefit of the managers rather than for maximizing shareholder wealth. It is well 
documented that one way of resolving this problem is to align the interests of managers 
and shareholders by offering managers equity stake in the firm (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). Consistent with the alignment view of managerial ownership, executive 
shareholding reduces information risk in financial reporting (Yu, 2008). Byard et al. 
(2006) also argue that aligning the interests of managers and shareholders reduces the 
information asymmetry between them and improves the quality of information available 
to users of financial reports (e.g., financial analysts). The resultant quality of 
governance should correlate positively with the analysts’ forecast accuracy and reduce 
forecast dispersion. Avramov et al. (2009) suggest that forecast dispersion, which 
measures uncertainty about the next year’s earnings, is an important component of asset 
valuation and negatively related to future stock returns. Yu (2010) also argues that the 
disclosure of corporate governance information affects analysts’ forecast bias and 
reduces forecast dispersion. In line with the above evidence mostly documented in the 
US market, two recent studies by Haß et al. (2014) and Huang and Wright (2015) on 





2.2 Executives, leadership shareholding, and analyst forecast 
Relatively few studies have examined the effects of firm governance structure on 
corporate disclosure practices and analyst forecasts (see Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005; 
Chung at al., 2015). However, recent evidence documented by Haß et al. (2014) and 
Huang and Wright (2015) suggest that better governance increases the quality of 
disclosure and the predictability of earnings among Chinese firms. Under agency 
theory, there are two conflicting views regarding the effects of managerial ownership on 
firm value: entrenchment and alignment effects. The entrenchment view suggests that 
managerial ownership can lead managers to pursue their personal goals at the expense 
of other shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). The entrenchment hypothesis 
therefore suggests a positive relationship between the managerial ownership and 
information asymmetry. On the other hand, the alignment hypothesis indicates that 
managerial equity ownership serves to align the interests of executive management and 
outside equity holders and mitigate the agency costs associated with the separation of 
ownership and control (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). According to alignment 
hypothesis, when executive managers’ interests are aligned with those of the 
shareholders, they become more committed and take actions to maximize firm value 
(Jensen and Meckling (1976). One of such actions taken by managers is to influence a 
firm’s information environment by improving public disclosure quality through the 
provision of additional and credible financial information (Han et al., 2014). Han et al. 
(2014) find managerial shareholding as an important internal monitoring function, 
which may improve a firm’s value and reduce information asymmetry. Despite the 
competing views on the effects of managerial ownership, there appears little evidence 
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regarding the relationship between the managerial ownership and the analyst forecast 
accuracy and forecast dispersion (Han et al., 2014). To the extent that managerial 
ownership aligns the interests of the leadership group of Chinese firms to shareholders’ 
interests, we expect executives and leadership ownership to improve disclosure quality 
and reduce forecast dispersion as such information form a basis of the analysts’ 
expectation of future firm performance (Abarbanell and Bushee, 1997). In this study, 
we examine the effects of top executive and firm leadership shareholdings which 
include all executives, the board of directors and supervisors on analyst forecast error 
and dispersion as proxies of information asymmetry. While using executives’ 
shareholding is common in prior literature, the use of shareholdings of general firm 
leadership groups appears appropriate for the Chinese settings to ensure robustness of 
our findings since they tend to play more coordinated roles to help build consensus 
around firm strategies (Shan and McIver, 2011). Such features of firm leadership in 
China may lead to policy stability and implementation and better corporate disclosure. 
In the light of the above argument, we hypothesize a negative association between 
executive and leadership shareholding and asymmetry: 
 
H1a: Executive and leadership shareholdings decrease analysts’ forecast error 
H1b: Executive and leadership shareholdings decrease analysts’ forecast dispersion  
 
2.3 Executives, leadership compensation and analyst forecast 
The Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Firms in China recognizes the use of 
cash incentive-based bonus pay and CEO compensation as means of minimizing 
conflict of interest between managers and shareholders (Firth et al., 2006a). The 
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executive management pay in China is primarily made up of cash compensation with 
very few firms using executive stock option schemes with very limited disclosures.
 2 
While a number of studies have examined managerial incentive schemes in China, 
evidence suggests that the relationship between cash compensation and firm 
performance is mixed (Firth et al., 2006a; 2007). The type of compensation scheme 
used by a firm has strong implications for agency costs. For example, managers who are 
compensated by a salary and cash bonus plan may have a shorter decision-making 
horizon than those who are compensated by a long-term stock option. From the 
standpoint of agency theory, Healy (1985) argue that managers on short-term rather 
than long-term compensation plan (e.g. share option) have incentives to engage in 
earnings management activities which improve short-term profits and reduce the quality 
of financial reporting and increases information asymmetry (Dechow and Dichev, 
2002). The above evidence generally indicates high executive and leadership 
compensation in China increases agency conflict and reduces information transparency 
which in turn reduces analyst forecast accuracy and increase forecast dispersion. In light 
of above, we put forward the following hypotheses: 
 
H2a: Executive and leadership cash compensation is positively related to analysts’ 
forecast error.  
H2b: Executive and leadership cash compensation is positively related to analysts’ 
forecast dispersion.  
 
                                                          
2
 Prior to 2005, executive compensation was mostly cash as CSRC did not allow managerial 
shareholding. From July 2005, the CSRC (2005a) allowed publicly traded firms that had 
successfully completed structural reforms to allow their top management, board members and 
supervisory board members to own shares. 
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The literature on executive compensation and performance has also examined through 
the lens of managerial power (Bebchuk and Weisbach, 2010). The managerial power 
approach views executive compensation as an outcome of close interpersonal 
relationships and negotiations between powerful corporate executives, especially CEOs, 
and weak corporate boards, which leads to the creation of inefficient managerial 
contracts that magnifies agency problems by increasing the conflict of interests between 
managers and shareholders (Bebchuk and Weisbach, 2010). Under managerial power 
approach, the literature indicates that the highly paid executives tend to have more 
power to pursuit self-interests and this power may encourage managers to reduce 
information disclosure which exacerbates agency problems. This strand of literature 
suggests that the predicted component of compensation arises from the characteristics of 
board and ownership structure in addition to factors such as firm size and performance. 
Typically, the prediction error, namely the excess compensation, is used as a proxy for 
management power (Chen et al. 2010a). A number of researchers such as Core et al. 
(1999), Brick et al. (2006), Chung et al. (2015) adopted similar measurement technique 
and suggest that excess compensation is associated with greater agency problems and 
poor firm value. A counter argument here may be referred to as the “investor adverse 
selection” view on the association between excess compensation and firm information 
disclosure suggested by Chung et al. (2015). Under this view, they argue that firms 
which pay higher executive compensation may be subjected to higher market scrutiny to 
increase disclosure in order to avoid investors’ adverse selection. We are interested in 
the association between excess compensation and information asymmetry in the 
Chinese market relative to the general perception of the corporate governance quality 
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documented earlier. Although the aforementioned competing arguments do not provide 
a clear prediction for Chinese firms, we posit the following hypotheses: 
 
H3a: Excess executive and leadership cash compensation is positively related to 
analysts’ error. 
H3b: Excess executive and leadership cash compensation is positively related to 
analysts’ forecast dispersion. 
 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1 Data and variables 
Data on executive and firm leadership shareholdings are collected from the China Stock 
Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database for all A-share non-financial 
listed companies. The statistics, based on the available information for the years 2007 – 
2012, are reported in Table 1. Approximately 1/2 and 2/3 of the firms-year observations 
have zero executive and zero overall firm leadership shareholding, respectively. Among 
the observations with positive shareholdings, executive management shareholding is 
approximately 4.46% while overall leadership shareholding constitutes approximately 
6.94%.  
 
(Insert Table 1 here please) 
 
We collect consensus analysts’ forecasts from systems provided by Wind Information 
Co., Ltd (WIND). WIND compiles the analysts’ earnings forecasts for Chinese A shares 
listed companies from the top 50 securities companies in China. Approximately 1/3 of 
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the listed firms are covered by analysts each year. We exclude firms in the financial 
industry due to different nature of assets and liabilities. Due to major changes to 
financial reporting standards in 2007, financial years prior to 2007 are not examined in 
this study to ensure consistency in the analysis. We collect FEPSit, which represents the 
one-year forward forecast of earnings per share for financial year t calculated as the 
average forecasts made by the security companies within a 90 day window up to the end 
of July of each year. Thus, these forecasts reflect the most recent financial report 
information
3
. We exclude observations for which only 1 individual security company 
forecast is available to ensure “consensus” forecast is meaningful. In addition, the 
maximum and minimum values of forecasts made by these institutions are also 
collected as FMAX and FMIN, respectively. Over the sample period 2007-2012, we 
obtained 4,257 observations of consensus forecasts and on average each of these 
consensus values represents forecasts by 6 institutions. Our forecast data compare 
favorably to the samples used in previous studies such as Ang and Ma (1999), Hu et al. 
(2008), and Truong (2011) in terms of both size and firm coverage. In addition to 
earnings forecasts, we also collected the realized earnings per share before extraordinary 
items denoted as NEPSit from the WIND company financial data; we then construct the 
following proxy measures of information asymmetry:  
 
Analyst consensus forecast error, ERRORit = |100 ∗ (FEPSit − NEPSit)/𝑃𝑖𝑡| 
 
Analyst forecasts dispersion, DISPERSIONit = 100 ∗ (FMAXit − FMINit)/𝑃𝑖𝑡 
 
                                                          
3
 The financial year for all Chinese listed firms is the calendar year, and annual reports are published 
before the end of April. 
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Both measures are multiplied by 100 and scaled by the price per share at the end of 
April to ensure consistency when comparing across firms. Since the average number of 
institutional forecasts for calculating the consensus expectations is 6, we follow Huang 
and Wright (2015) and Huang (2016) by adopting a “range” measure of forecast 
dispersion rather than a standard deviation measure. The use of this type of “range” in 
forecasts as proxy for information asymmetry and earnings uncertainty is common in 
the literature on company earnings forecast (see Han, 2013 for a review of this 
literature). Using price deflated error and dispersion measures is consistent with Truong 
(2011) and Huang and Wright (2015) thus avoiding problems associated with negative 
earnings compared to alternative measures scaled by realized earning. When we replace 
the mean analyst forecast with the median analyst forecast from WIND, the results in 
this study are unchanged. 
 
Other financial and accounting data including executive and firm leadership 
shareholdings and compensation information are collected from CSMAR and WIND.
4
 
The summary statistics of the sample variables incorporated in the paper matched 
against the available analysts’ forecasts are reported in Table 2.  
 
(Insert Table 2 here please) 
 
Table 3 shows pairwise correlations among the variables. Analysts’ error is negatively 
correlated with the corporate governance variables including executive and leadership 
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 The mean total cash compensation for the top 3 executives and the total cash compensation for overall 




compensation. Analysts’ forecast dispersion is negatively correlated with the per person 
shareholding but positively correlated with the cash compensation variables. We further 
explore these relationships in properly controlled regression models in the next section. 
 
(Insert Table 3 here please) 
 
3.2 Models and methods 
We adopt the following fixed-effects models to test our hypotheses on the relationship 
between the executive/leadership shareholdings, cash compensation and the level of 
analysts’ consensus forecast error and forecast dispersion:  
 
ERRORit = αi + β Shareholdingit−1 + λ Payit−1 + γ Xit−1 + τt + εit 
DISPERSIONit = αi + β Shareholdingit−1 + λ Payit−1 + γ Xit−1 + τt + εit 
 
The models include fixed firm effects αi, fixed time effects τt, and a disturbance term 
εit . Shareholdingit refers to the percentages of executives’ or average leadership 
shareholding per person variables Ex.SH and L.SH. Variable Payit refers to the log of 
top 3 executives’ or average leadership cash compensation per person Log(Ex.P) and 
Log(L.P).
5
 We use the log transformed compensation values due to log normal 
distributions of the executive and leadership compensation which is also documented in 
Table 1. In particular, annual report information on shareholding and cash compensation 
values are regressed against the observed consensus analysts’ forecast error and 
forecasts dispersion over the 90 days window following the publish of financial reports. 
                                                          
5
 Alternatively, we test models using the total leadership cash compensations, and our findings are 
consistent with the results reported. 
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We choose the analysts’ forecasts made between May and July in calculating the 
forecast error and dispersion measures and regress against the independent variables at 
the prior year end to control for endogeneity problems. We recognize that this does not 
completely alleviate endogeneity problems hence remains a methodological limitation. 
However, given the lack of appropriate instrumental variables for executives’ 
shareholding and pay, we use fixed effects to control for omitted variables and the 
lagged variables to control for simultaneity issues. Our methodology is in line with 
recent studies on Chinese analysts by Haß et al. (2014), Huang and Wright (2015), and 
Huang (2016). 
 
 Xit refers to a number of control variables that may affect analyst expectations. In order 
to make an incremental contribution to the literature, it is necessary to control for 
factors that have already been identified by prior studies to affect the analyst forecast 
accuracy. Independent directors, concentrated and institutional shareholders play 
monitoring role and improve the quality of governance within a firm. Soundness of 
corporate governance is associated with less information asymmetry and forecast 
accuracy (Karamanou and Vefeas, 2005). Professional investors, block tradable 
shareholders, independent director monitoring measured by the percentage of 
institutional investors’ shareholding at the past year’s end (INS.SH), the percentage of 
shareholding by top 10 tradable shareholders in total (SH.CON), and the number of 
independent directors to total number of directors ratio (B.IND), respectively. 
Following Francis et al. (2004), we control for the innate sources of earning attributes 
including volatility, firm size, leverage, growth opportunities and profitability. Prior 
literature suggests that volatility causes forecasting difficulties and produce forecast 
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dispersions (Goss and Waegelein, 1993). Stock performance is measured by annual 
stock volatility as standard deviations of returns (Volatility), and Jensen’s alpha 
measure of excess stock returns against the Shanghai Stock Composite Index (Alpha). 
Firm size controls for differences in the information environment, as large firms tend to 
attract more public attention and media coverage (Chen et al., 2010b). Firm size is 
measured as the log of total market capitalization of both tradable and restricted A and 
B shares in Chinese Yuan at the end of April LOG(MC)). Firms with high growth 
opportunities are often cash poor and may prefer the use of noncash compensation such 
as share options (Roulstone, 2003). Growth potential is measured by the Price-to-book 
ratio at the end of April (P/B) and three years historical average growth in earnings 
(GROWTH). Recent period accounting profitability, measured by return on equity 
using earnings before extraordinary items (ROE) and earnings quality measured as 
percentage of earnings from operating activities (EARN.Q). Core et al. (1999) suggest 
that large firms are difficult to monitor, making earnings difficult to forecast. Leverage 
is measured as the log of the value of debt as a percentage of market value of equity at 
the end of April (LOG(D/E)). Goss and Waegelein, (1993) find firms with higher levels 
of leverage engage in more manipulation of financial statement leading to more forecast 
dispersion. We apply the methods proposed in Arellano (1987) and Stock and Watson 
(2008) to obtain standard errors that are robust to cross-sectional heteroskedasticity and 
within-panel (serial) correlation by clustering on the panel variable. 
 
For H3a and H3b regarding the influence of excessive cash compensation on analyst 
forecasts, we follow a model similar to those implemented in Core et al. (1999), Brick 
et al. (2006), Chung et al. (2015) which suggest that the predicted component of 
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compensation arises from the characteristics of board and ownership structure, in 
addition, to factors such as firm size and performance. We first adopt a fixed-effects 
model and estimate the expected cash compensation based on determinants including 
managerial equity shareholding and board independence as measures of managerial 
structural power in determining their compensations, Tobin’s Q ratio as a proxy for firm 
growth opportunities, return on equity as profitability associated pay reward, and firm 
size measured by market capitalization.  
 
Log(𝑃𝐴𝑌𝑖𝑡) = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐿𝑂𝐺(𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛
′𝑠 𝑄)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽4 ∗ 𝐿𝑂𝐺(𝑀𝐶)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5 ∗ 𝐵. 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 +τt + εit 
 
The excess cash compensations for executives and firm leaders are then calculated as 
the difference between their actual pay minus the expected pay from the model 
predictions.  
𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 Log (𝑃𝐴𝑌𝑖𝑡) = 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝐴𝑌𝑖𝑡) – E[Log(𝑃𝐴𝑌𝑖𝑡)] 
 
We then incorporate the excess cash compensation values in our models on the 
consensus analysts’ forecast error and analyst’ forecast dispersion.  
 
4. Results 
4.1 Executive and leadership shareholding, compensation, and analyst forecast 
The results in Table 4 models 1-4 show that executives and leadership shareholding 
variables (Ex.SH and L.SH respectively) do not exert significant influence on analyst 
consensus forecast error. Models 5-8 of Table 4 show that executive/leadership 
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shareholdings have insignificant impact on the analysts’ forecast dispersion. According 
to interest alignment argument (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) for managerial 
shareholding, equity ownership reduces conflict of interest (information risk and 
asymmetry), improves the quality of information available to financial analysts but this 
appears not to be the case and hence hypotheses H1a and H1b are not supported. The 
rejection of these hypotheses may be due to the entrenchment effect (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1989) of executive/leadership shareholdings. The findings may be explained by 
the coordinated nature of firm leadership in Chinese firms (Shan and McIver, 2011). 
The fact that firm executives and insider directors act in a coordinated way may 
facilitate managerial entrenchment suggesting that executives face little or no scrutiny 
from independent directors and supervisory board members (Lin et al. 1998; Yuan et 
al., 2009).   
 
(Insert Table 4 here please) 
 
In terms of executive and leadership group compensation, the coefficients for the 
compensation variables Log(Ex.P) and Log(L.P) in models 1-4 appear insignificant, 
suggesting that higher compensation is not associated with higher information 
asymmetry as measured by the consensus analyst forecast error. In models 5-8 
regarding the forecast dispersion, we find both executive and leadership compensation 
are positively and significantly associated with forecast dispersion suggesting the 
presence of severe information asymmetry. These results provide a strong support to 




As an additional analysis, in models 2, 4, 6, and 8 of Table 4, we further include 
interactions of executive/leadership shareholding and executive/leadership 
compensation variables as independent variables in our models. These alternative 
models allow us to capture the marginal effect of executive/leadership compensation on 
analyst forecast error and dispersion conditional on the level of executive/leadership 
shareholding. In line with the recommendation by Brambor et al. (2006) on the 
importance of interpreting marginal effects for interaction models, we compute the 
marginal effects as the sum of the coefficients on Log(Ex.P) and Ex.SH*Log(Ex.P) in 
model 2 and 6 and the sum of coefficients on Log(L.P) and L.SH*Log(L.P) in models 4 
and 8 together with the corresponding standard errors of this sums. Results reported in 
Table 4 show that these marginal effects are consistently positive and significant. 
According to these marginal effects, we conclude that executive/leadership cash 
compensation is positively and significantly associated with analyst forecast error and 
forecast dispersion where executive/leadership shareholdings are higher. Such results 
indicate that for firms that pay high cash compensation, executive and leadership 
shareholdings appear not to provide an effective mechanism to help managers’ and 
shareholders’ interests alignment and improve information disclosure. Rather executive 
and leadership shareholdings appear to facilitate managerial entrenchment and give 
highly paid executives/leadership stronger structural power which adversely affect 
information disclosure leading to larger analyst forecast error and dispersion.  
 
An explanation of these findings might be that compensations paid to Chinese 
executives and board members, which are mostly in the form of cash, are short-term 
performance based. Executive management therefore are more likely to engage in 
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financial statement manipulation (Dechow and Dichev, 2002), disclose less information 
thereby increasing the analyst forecast error and dispersion. The findings are in line with 
agency theory. Another plausible explanation may be that of opacity hypothesis which 
posits that stronger leadership/executive power makes the information environment 
more opaque. Agency conflicts may increase the potential for the firm leadership to 
withhold or manipulate information in order to mask inefficiencies and make monetary 
gains through cash compensation (Bartov and Mohanram, 2004).  
 
4.2 Excess executive and leadership compensation and analyst forecast 
Our further analysis in Table 5 takes into account the influences of forecasts using the 
excess cash compensation components detailed in the previous section. 
 
(Insert Table 5 here please) 
 
We notice in models 1 and 2 of the table that excess compensation variables:  
Log(Ex.P) and Log(L.P) are insignificantly associated with the consensus analyst 
forecast error. Hypothesis H3a is not supported. Moreover, as the coefficients on excess 
compensation in these models are statistically insignificant, results so far do not provide 
a clear support to either the managerial power view (Bebchuk and Weisbach, 2010) or 
investor adverse selection view (Chung et al., 2015) on the association between excess 
compensation and information disclosure. Regarding our analysis on the dispersion of 
analysts’ forecasts reported in the models 3-4 of Table 5, we find a positive and 
significant association between excess compensation variables and forecast dispersion. 
These results give strong support to the managerial power view on the association 
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between executive/leadership compensation and firm information disclosure. Contrary 
to argument put forth by Chung et al. (2015) that firms which pay higher executive 
compensation may also be subject to higher market scrutiny to increase disclosure in 
order to avoid investor adverse selection, our results on Chinese firms show that firms 
which pay excess executive compensation are not subject to stronger pressures to lower 
information asymmetry.  
 
Regarding the influence of the control variables in our models, we generally find 
forecast error and forecast dispersion are negatively associated with Jensen’s Alpha, 
LOG(MC), ROE, and P/B suggesting lower information asymmetry for firms with good 
stock return performance, larger firms, high profitability firms, and high market 
valuation firms. The results are in line with the recent study by Han et al. (2014) who 
found a negative and significant relationship between firm size, growth firms and the 
amount of information available about the firm in general. However, leverage is 
positively associated with information asymmetry.  
 
4.3 Further robustness tests 
To ensure the validity of our findings, we perform two sets of robustness tests in Table 
6. We show robustness tests using scaled excess compensation measures in Panel A and 
results further controlling for the predictability of earnings using a random-walk model 
in Panel B. In panel A, the excess compensation measures are computed using executive 
cash pay scaled by the firm market capitalization Ex.P/MC and the leadership cash pay 
scaled by the firm market capitalization L.P/MC, respectively. The compensation 
prediction model follows that of Table 5. Regression results appear indifferent from 
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those reported in Table 5 and confirm that firms pay higher excess compensation to 
executives and directors are associated with higher information asymmetry irrespective 
of the scaled compensation measures used here. 
 
In panel B, we follow Huang and Wright (2015) on the predictability of firm level 
earnings using a random-walk earnings prediction model based on 1-year lagged 
earnings per share Lag1_EPS and dividend yield D/P. In addition, we further control for 
the percentage of non-tradable state-shares and legal person shares in the models as 
Huang and Wright (2015) suggest non-tradable state shares determine earnings forecast 
quality. Other control variables follow table 5 regressions. Results reported are 
consistent with those reported in Table 5 and confirm that the random-walk model 
performs well in earnings prediction. After controlling for the random-walk model, 




In this paper, we investigate the impact of top executives and firm leadership 
shareholdings and cash compensation on analyst consensus forecast error and forecast 
dispersion as proxies for information asymmetry. We argue that consensus and goal 
congruence among Chinese firm leadership empowers executive management and 
exacerbates agency costs. Analysts as an external corporate governance mechanism 
follow closely information on corporate governance and their earnings forecasts reflect 
the effects of within-firm governance quality, particularly firm level information 
environment. We show that top executives and the average leadership shareholdings per 
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person have insignificant influence on information asymmetry. This indicates that the 
alignment effect of managerial shareholding appears weak and facilitate managerial 
entrenchment among Chinese firms given lower levels of managerial shareholding and 
calls for regulatory and investors’ attention.  
 
We further test executive and leadership compensation from the perspective of 
managerial power and our results are in line with the managerial power view on excess 
executive compensation (Core et al., 1999; Brick et al., 2006; Chung et al., 2015). We 
find that both cash compensation and excess cash compensation exert no influence on 
analyst forecast error suggesting firms which pay high executive and leadership 
compensation are not under pressure, internal or external, to disclose more information. 
When considering interaction between executive/leadership compensation and 
shareholding in our models, we further find that executive/leadership cash 
compensation is positively and significantly associated with analyst forecast error where 
executive/leadership shareholdings are higher. We also document a positive effect of 
compensation and excess compensation on analyst forecasts dispersion which strongly 
indicates increased information asymmetry associated with high compensation paying 
firms. Taken together, these findings suggest stronger managerial structural power is 
detrimental to firm information environment. The implication is self-evident suggesting 
executive compensation, mostly paid in the form of cash among Chinese firms, as a 
means to align the interests of firm leadership and shareholders to reduce agency costs 




A limitation of this study is that there is no data available on the proportion of 
incentive-based managerial payment for Chinese market sufficiently enough for 
empirical analysis. Hence we follow Core et al. (1999); Brick et al. (2006); and Chung 
et al. (2015) by relying on the indirectly modeled excess component of managerial cash 
compensations to proxy for managerial power and agency costs. Along with the fast 
modernization of the Chinese market, just over 160 firms have already successfully 
implemented incentives pay reforms up to the end of 2014. We expect the availability of 
this type of incentives pay data will allow practical empirical tests in the future. We 
suggest that, future research should incorporate incentives pay reform data to test the 
extent of the incentive pay reform success and its impact on firm performance and 
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Table 1: Executive and Leadership Shareholdings  
  Executives (Ex.SH) Total Leadership (L.SH) 
 
Holding=0 Holding>0 Holding=0 Holding>0 






















Notes: Statistics are based on available information for all A-share listed companies for the years 2007 – 
2013. Firm leadership is defined as, including all directors, supervisors, and executives. Shareholdings 
data are collected as the total holdings of all executives and firm leaders. Ex.SH refers to the total of the 
top 3 executives’ shareholding; L.SH refers to the average shareholding percentage per person by firm 





Table 2: Summary of Variables 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ERROR 4210 2.39 2.93 0.03 18.96 
DISPERSION 4210 1.38 1.66 0.01 8.57 
FEPS 4257 0.54 0.46 -0.44 5.80 
FMAX 4257 0.63 0.55 -0.44 6.40 
FMIN 4257 0.46 0.39 -0.65 5.15 
Log(Ex.P) 4727 13.84 0.84 10.20 18.77 
Log(L.P) 4693 4.90 0.81 1.46 8.75 
Excess Log(Ex.P) 4570 0.05 0.69 -3.57 3.13 
Excess Log(Ex.P) 4571 0.05 0.67 -4.56 2.50 
L.NUM 4714 20.55 4.66 10.00 61.00 
NEPS 4257 0.33 0.49 -3.62 5.90 
INS.SH 4009 29.81 23.14 0.00 82.70 
SH.CON 4730 22.19 20.57 0.51 71.67 
Volatility 3888 51.82 13.88 25.41 89.90 
Alpha 4025 0.26 0.41 -0.53 1.64 
P/B 4210 4.67 4.02 0.83 41.80 
ROE 4254 8.65 11.36 -34.94 49.16 
GROWTH 3336 6.68 135.99 -421.77 248.46 
EARN.Q 3369 72.39 50.92 -108.93 107.59 
Tobin’s Q 4241 2.07 1.27 0.82 8.77 
B.IND 4221 0.36 0.05 0.09 0.67 
LOG(MC) 4210 8.58 1.18 5.72 11.84 
LOG(D/E) 4085 2.61 1.40 -1.51 5.50 
Non-Trade 7073  45.63  21.91  0.00  82.00  
D/P 8242  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.04  
 
Notes: This table reports the summary statistics for the sample used in the regressions. Variables are winsorized at 
1% and 99%. The variable names are: FEPS, average institutional analysts’ forecasts during 90 days until the end of 
April; FMAX, the maximum value of such forecasts; FMIN, the minimum value of such forecasts; Log(Ex.P) is the 
log of the total for the top 3 executives’ cash compensation in thousands of Chinese Yuan.  Log (L.P) is the log of 
average leadership cash compensation per person in thousands of Chinese Yuan; Excess Log(Ex.P) and Excess 
Log(L.P) refer to the excess executive and leadership compensation, respectively. L.NUM, total number of directors, 
supervisors, and executives; NEPS, the actual reported earnings per share before extraordinary items; ERROR, the 
analysts’ consensus earnings forecast error scaled by price per share, ERROR = |100*(FEPS-NEPS)/pt|; 
DISPERSION, the dispersion in analysts’ forecasts scaled by price per share, 100*(FMAX - FMIN)/pt; INS.SH, the 
percentage of institutional investors’ shareholding at the past year’s end; SH.CON, the percentage of shareholding by 
top 10 tradable shareholders in total. Volatility, annual stock volatility as standard deviations of returns; Alpha, 
Jensen’s alpha measure of excess stock returns against the Shanghai Stock Composite Index; P/B, price to book ratio 
at the end of April; ROE, return on equity using earnings before extraordinary items; GROWTH, three years 
historical average growth in earnings; EARN.Q, earnings quality measured as percentage of earnings from operating 
activities; Tobin’s Q, calculated as the total market value of the equity and debt divided by the book value of assets 
excluding intangible assets, calculated using values at the year’s end; B.IND., the number of independent directors to 
total number of directors ratio; LOG(MC), the log of total market capitalization of both tradable and restricted A and 
B shares in Chinese Yuan at the end of April; LOG(D/E), the log of the value of debt as a percentage of market value 
of equity at the end of April. Non-Trade, the percentage of non-tradable state shares and legal person shares; D/P, the 
dividend yield calculated as dividend per share divided by the price per share at the end of April. 
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Table 3: Pairwise Correlations 
  ERROR DIS. Ex.SH Log(Ex.P) L.SH Log(L.P) L.NUM B.IND. INS.SH SH.CON Vol. Alpha LOG(MC) P/B ROE GROWTH EARN.Q 
DISPERSION          0.18*    
               Ex.SH        -0.08*  -0.08*   
              Log(Ex.P)        -0.12*  0.15* -0.04*   
             L.SH        -0.08*  -0.08* 0.79* -0.08*   
            Log(L.P)        -0.13*  0.13* -0.02* 0.93* -0.03*   
           L.NUM        -0.00  0.16* -0.11* 0.33* -0.17* 0.28*   
          B.IND        -0.02  -0.02 0.06* 0.06* 0.07* 0.08* -0.09*   
         INS.SH        -0.13*  0.10* -0.05* 0.37* -0.08* 0.37* 0.12* 0.04*   
        SH.CON        -0.06*  0.11* 0.11* 0.05* 0.15* 0.04* 0.05* 0.03* 0.21*   
       Volatility          0.09  -0.09* 0.02 -0.07* 0.04* -0.06* -0.07* 0.01 -0.07* -0.07*   
      Alpha        -0.01*  -0.13* 0.05* -0.04* 0.06* -0.04 -0.04* -0.02 -0.09* -0.09* 0.35*   
     LOG(MC)        -0.21*  0.17* -0.10* 0.58* -0.14* 0.56* 0.37* 0.10* 0.47* 0.47* 0.01 -0.02   
    P/B        -0.15*  -0.17* 0.22* 0.02 0.22* 0.02 -0.12* 0.06* 0.12* 0.12* 0.33* 0.22* 0.12*   
   ROE        -0.17*  0.07* 0.03* 0.28* 0.05* 0.28* 0.07* -0.01 0.24* 0.24* -0.03 0.24* 0.28* 0.23*   
  GROWTH        -0.52  0.02 0.01* 0.00 -0.01 0.02* 0.00 0.03* 0.02* 0.02* -0.02* -0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02   
 EARN.Q        -0.00  0.00 0.03* -0.02 0.04* -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00* -0.01* 0.00 -0.05* 0.01 0.04 0.27*   
LOG(D/E)          0.29*  0.20* -0.20* -0.09* -0.20* -0.09* 0.13* -0.05* -0.16* -0.16* -0.22* -0.17* -0.13* -0.41* -0.23* 0.02 -0.02 




Table 4: Executive and leadership compensation and information asymmetry 
Dep. Var. Forecast error Forecast dispersion 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
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0.700** 
   
0.373* 
    
(1.98) 











B.IND 0.373 0.461 0.267 0.390 -1.071 -1.046 -0.996 -0.931 
 
(0.20) (0.25) (0.14) (0.21) (-1.07) (-1.07) (-1.03) (-0.98) 
INS.SH 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 
 
(0.71) (0.75) (0.86) (1.03) (1.29) (1.31) (1.24) (1.37) 
SH.CON 0.019** 0.019** 0.017* 0.018* 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 
 
(2.09) (2.15) (1.86) (1.95) (0.37) (0.40) (0.50) (0.58) 
Volatility 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004 
 
(0.63) (0.66) (0.46) (0.55) (1.24) (1.26) (1.16) (1.24) 
Alpha -0.544*** -0.540*** -0.529*** -0.520*** -0.577*** -0.576*** -0.589*** -0.585*** 
 
(-4.15) (-4.13) (-4.06) (-3.99) (-6.01) (-5.99) (-6.15) (-6.09) 
LOG(MC) -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 
(-2.19) (-2.20) (-2.09) (-2.18) (-4.38) (-4.39) (-4.34) (-4.40) 
P/B 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.005 -0.021 -0.022 -0.023 -0.023 
 
(0.18) (0.16) (0.14) (0.13) (-1.49) (-1.50) (-1.62) (-1.62) 
ROE -0.117*** -0.117*** -0.118*** -0.118*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 
 
(-8.92) (-8.92) (-8.94) (-8.98) (4.19) (4.20) (4.34) (4.36) 
GROWTH -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 
(-0.52) (-0.54) (-0.55) (-0.60) (-1.24) (-1.24) (-1.27) (-1.30) 
EARN.Q -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 
(-0.52) (-0.55) (-0.43) (-0.35) (-0.19) (-0.20) (-0.13) (-0.08) 
LOG(D/E) 0.066 0.063 0.060 0.056 0.009 0.008 0.002 -0.000 
 
(1.01) (0.97) (0.92) (0.87) (0.17) (0.16) (0.03) (-0.00) 
Marginal effect  0.011***  0.018***  0.262***  0.221*** 
Standard error  0.004  0.006  0.001  0.003 
Observations 2,835 2,835 2,835 2,835 2,835 2,835 2,835 2,835 
R-squared 0.239 0.240 0.242 0.244  0.086   0.086   0.086   0.088  
Number of firms 831 831 831 831 831 831 831 831 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
Notes: The dependent variable  in models 1-4 is the analysts’ earnings forecast error scaled by price per share, ERROR = 
|100*(FEPS-NEPS)/pt| and in models 5-8 is in analysts’ forecasts dispersion scaled by price per share, DISPERSIONit 
=100*(FMAX - FMIN)/pt. We compute the marginal effects as the sum of the coefficients on Log(Ex.P) and 
Ex.SH*Log(Ex.P) in model 2 and 6 and the sum of coefficients on Log(L.P) and L.SH*Log(L.P) in models 4 and 8 together 
with the corresponding standard errors of these sums. The regressions control for fixed firm effects and year effects, and the 
corresponding t-statistics are calculated using standard errors adjusted for clusters in stock code. Coefficients on the year 
dummies are not reported to conserve space. Subsamples are divided based on the presence of executive/leadership 




Table 5: Excess executive and leadership compensation and information asymmetry 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep. Var. Forecast error Forecast dispersion 

















INS.SH -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 
 
(-0.51) (-0.39) (-1.39) (-1.46) 
SH.CON 0.005 0.004 0.014*** 0.015*** 
 
(0.64) (0.51) (2.96) (3.03) 
Volatility 0.017*** 0.016*** -0.003 -0.003 
 
(3.55) (3.51) (-0.94) (-1.23) 
Alpha -1.237*** -1.231*** -0.410*** -0.414*** 
 
(-7.96) (-7.93) (-4.54) (-4.55) 
P/B -0.157*** -0.160*** -0.030** -0.032** 
 
(-6.03) (-6.06) (-2.37) (-2.54) 
GROWTH -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 
(-0.35) (-0.33) (-0.61) (-0.65) 
EARN.Q -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
 
(-0.65) (-0.71) (-0.69) (-0.58) 
LOG(D/E) 0.209*** 0.208*** 0.100** 0.091** 
 
(2.99) (2.99) (2.18) (2.00) 
Observations 2,831 2,831 2,615 2,615 
R-squared 0.100 0.100 0.050 0.048 
Number of firms 831 831 831 831 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
 
Notes: The regressions control for fixed firm effects and year effects, and the corresponding t-statistics are calculated using 
standard errors adjusted for clusters in stock code. Coefficients on the year dummies are not reported to conserve space. The 
dependent variable for models 1 and 2 is analysts’ forecast error, and for models 3 and 4 is forecasts dispersion. Variable 
definitions follow table 2. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
We adopt a fixed-effects model to estimate the predicted managerial cash compensation based on determinants including 
managerial equity shareholding 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡  and board independence 𝐵. 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡  as measures of managerial structural 
power in determining their compensations, Tobin’s Q ratio as a proxy for firm growth opportunities, return on equity 𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 
as profitability associated pay reward, and firm size measured by the log of market capitalization 𝐿𝑂𝐺(𝑀𝐶)𝑖𝑡.  
 
𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝐴𝑌𝑖𝑡) = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐿𝑂𝐺(𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛
′𝑠 𝑄)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝐿𝑂𝐺(𝑀𝐶)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5 ∗ 𝐵. 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡  +τt + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
The model includes fixed firm effects αi and fixed time effects τt, and R-squared of the prediction regressions are 37% and 
29% for executives cash compensation and average per person leadership cash compensation, respectively.The excessive 
cash compensations for executives and firm leaders are then calculated as the difference between their actual log pay minus 





Table 6: Robustness tests 
Panel A: Using scaled prediction errors and dispersions 
Model 1 2 3 4 
Dep. Var. Forecast error Forecast error Forecast dispersion Forecast dispersion 

















Controls YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 2,831 2,831 2,831 2,831 
R-squared 0.100 0.100 0.049 0.047 
Number of firms 831 831 831 831 
Panel B: Controlling for predictability of earnings 
Model 1 2 3 4 
Dep. Var. Forecast error Forecast error Forecast dispersion Forecast dispersion 

















Lag1_EPS -1.708** -1.745** 0.339** 0.350** 
 
(-2.49) (-2.50) (2.02) (2.08) 
D/P -0.049 -0.048 0.244*** 0.254*** 
 
(-0.59) (-0.59) (4.75) (4.88) 
Non-trade 0.007 0.006 -0.005 -0.005 
 
(0.63) (0.58) (-0.94) (-1.01) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 2,831 2,831 2,615 2,615 
R-squared 0.170 0.172 0.156 0.156 
Number of firms 831 831 831 831 
 
This table shows robustness tests using scaled excess compensation measures in Panel A and results further controlling for 
the predictability of earnings in Panel B. In panel A, the excess compensation measures are computed using scaled executive 
cash pay scaled by the firm market capitalization Ex.P/MC and the leadership cash pay scaled by the firm market 
capitalization L.P/MC, respectively. The compensation prediction model follows that of Table 5. In panel B, we further 
control for the random-walk earnings prediction model using 1-year lagged earnings per share Lag1_EPS, and dividend yield 
D/P. In addition, we further control for the percentage of non-tradable state-shares and legal person shares in the models. 
Other control variables follow table 5 regressions. 
